NEWSWEEK: There’s been a lot of speculation that Halutz’s resignation could trigger a domino effect—that [Defense Minister Amir] Peretz and Olmert may be next.
Ephraim Sneh: Look, the inquiry commission led by supreme judge [Eliyahu] Winograd is doing a very serious job. I think we have to wait patiently until they conclude their work. And according to their recommendations, the ministers who are involved will have to make their own decisions. Doing anything before that is unjust and premature.
Did you think it was time for Halutz to go?
We thought that it would be better if he could implement the lessons which the [inquiry] process he led produced. He decided differently, but we have to respect his decision.
Is Olmert going to survive this process? Will he still be in power six months from now?
In our country, six months is an eternity.
What do you make of the revelation this week that Israel had been holding secret talks with the Syrians over the past two years?
I’m not sure that this story is very well based. The trouble with Syria is its deeds totally contradict the words of [Syrian Foreign Minister] Walid Mouallem. Syria allows its border with Iraq to be porous. Syria smuggles arms to Hizbullah. And it doesn’t exert pressure on Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal to behave. Those actions discourage those who are ready to explore the option of talks with Syria.
What should the next step be in dealing with Iran?
I think effective sanctions against Iran should be taken promptly because of the danger that they will soon reach their nuclear-military capability. That’s what this urgency is all about. I think we should avoid talking about the military option. Let’s concentrate on what’s doable now.
The London Sunday Times recently ran a story quoting Israeli military officials saying tactical nuclear weapons are being considered as a first-strike option against Iran.
It’s nonsense. Many details, but it’s all bulls—. The whole story is baseless.
What was your reaction to the Iraq Study Group report’s recommendations that the United States engage Syria and Iran diplomatically?
It seems to me that both those countries interpret what you call engagement as a sort of appeasement. This kind of dictatorship can smell weakness, and they recoil when they face a strong response. This is the language they understand. What we need is not engagement, but to stop the path of Iran toward getting a nuclear bomb. This is what I consider urgent.
But will all this saber-rattling really be effective? What if Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad calls the bluff?
Look, I’m reluctant to speak about this option. Let’s concentrate on what’s doable immediately. And [that] is U.N. sanctions.
How do you think the sanctions could be strengthened?
You know, Iran is the fourth-largest exporter of crude oil, but Iran imports 40 percent of its gasoline consumption. An international embargo on selling gasoline to Iran can be very effective. By the way, the purpose of the sanctions is not [only] to force the regime to abandon the military-nuclear project. It is to create the conditions that this regime can be removed.
So you don’t think it’s possible to strike a “grand bargain” with Iran, along the lines of the Libyan deal?
I don’t think it’s feasible, given the global aspirations of Ahmadinejad to turn his country into a global superpower. I don’t think he’ll be able to relinquish what makes him, in his perception, a superpower. He’s acting out of a sense of messianic mission.
What do you make of reports last week about rifts between Ayatollah Khamenei and Ahmadinejad?
There are no substantial differences between the ayatollahs. A regime change in Iran means a secular, democratic regime. And I believe that this is the wish of the vast majority of the Iranians. Sanctions encourage disagreements and rifts within the existing regime. But the desired change is not that one hard-liner will replace another one.
